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Abstract. Location-based applications require a user’s movements and
positions to provide customized services. However, location is a sensitive
piece of information that should not be revealed unless strictly neces-
sary. In this paper we propose a procedure that allows a user to control
the precision in which his location information is exposed to a service
provider, while allowing his location to be certified by a location ver-
ifier. Our procedure makes use of a hash chain to certify the location
information in such a way that the hashes of the chain correspond to an
increasing level of precision.
1 Introduction
The main challenge faced in security protocol design concerns the need to satisfy
a number of conflicting security requirements. In the domain of location-based
services, this conflict shows in the tension between location assurance and loca-
tion privacy. On the one hand, service providers must know their clients’ location
with some level of assurance while, on the other hand, clients do not want to
expose more location details than strictly needed for the requested service.
A second factor complicating the design of a security protocol is that its
functional requirements and the assumptions concerning the system strongly
depend on the intended usage scenario of the protocol. This factor clearly shows
in location-based service scenarios, each of them leading to essentially different
solutions. In the following, we briefly exemplify three of such scenarios.
A common usage scenario is that of e-tolling, in which the location of a car
is periodically sensed and used to determine the amount of toll due. In this
particular scenario, which gave rise to solutions like VPriv [1] and PrETP [2]
assumptions dictate that location data must be stored at the car for oﬄine
usage. However, for online usage data must be stored at the server, on the
condition that they are used by this service only. Location integrity requires
either tamper resistant hardware (a solution which preserves drivers’ privacy)
or on-road checking spots for a-posteriori assurance (which weakens privacy).
Location privacy suggests that cars can hide in the crowd of other vehicles, but
service providers need to have enough information to bill correctly.
Another scenario is the use of positioning information to inform the client of
the availability of services near his current location, such as the nearest Chinese
restaurant or the closest gas station for which the user has a fidelity card. In
this scenario location-spoofing by the client does not harm the service, allowing
protocol designers to mainly focus on the associated privacy concerns.
Yet another scenario is that a client makes use of a number of different
services in a certain area or region. Examples of such services are physical access
control, a loyalty program of a filling station, location-dependent congestion
or parking charges, etc. Such services have in common that the client’s location
must be assured in order to prevent theft of service, but they differ in the required
precision of the client’s location data. Thus, the disclosure of the location data
has to adhere to the need-to-know principle.
The latter usage scenario so far has not received as much attention as several
other scenarios, while this particular setting allows for novel approaches. In this
paper we will design a simple solution for this particular usage scenario. The
main characteristic of the proposed protocol is that the client’s location only
has to be assured once, while the client can later decide for each particular
service used with which precision his location will be revealed. This is achieved
by using hash chains. We will design our solution under the assumption of a
location verifier. This is a trusted entity that can assess and certify a user’s
claimed location, based on a set of raw location data coming from, e.g., a GPS
satellite.
This paper is structured as follows. In Section 2 we describe the general
architecture that we assume for location-based service provision and location
assurance. In Section 3 we develop the basic notations used in our design and
we provide our location-blinding protocol, together with an informal validation.
In Section 4 we discuss some related work and in Section 5 we summarize our
findings and draw some conclusions.
2 General Architecture
We address the problem of balancing location reliability and privacy in the par-
ticular infrastructure which relies on the Global Positioning System (GPS) to
calculate locations. This choice is motivated as follows. Recently, Harpes et al.
propose to fix the absence of assurance in GPS location by introducing a loca-
tion verifier, which is accountable to verify and sign the user’s location [3]. If
this solution was implemented, it would be possible to provide assurance that
a given device was at a given place at a given time. We will provide a global
description of this architecture and the underlying assumptions.
We describe our architecture for location-based service provision in terms
of roles involved and of communication links among them (see Figure 1). A
User Device (e.g., a GPS-enabled phone) processes the signals coming from the
GPS satellites to calculate its own geographical position. Usually, the calculated
position is communicated directly to the Service Provider, who uses it to adapt
the service on the basis of the user’s location. The communication between the
user device and the service provider flows over channels for wireless connectivity
such as those used in Wi-Fi or in the 3G wireless technologies.
As explained in Section 1, our architecture also includes a Location Verifier.
Its task is to certify the integrity of the location information that the user is
going to send to the service provider (see also [3]). In fact, the user device sends
its location claim to the location verifier first. In Figure 1 this link is labeled (1).
If the claim is verified to be correct, the location verifier sends back a location
certificate to the user who, in turn, presents it to the service provider. This link
is labeled (2). If the service provider has questions about the proof, he might
contact the location verifier directly. This link is labeled (3).
Fig. 1. The architecture for location-based services with location assurance.
There are many reasons to have a location verifier responsible for a high level
of location assurance. Many location-based applications, for instance speed-limit
enforcement, high valued assets tracking, and forensic reconstruction, actually
can function properly only with reliable location data. However, the user device
can fail in providing a correct location. First, user devices can be targets of mea-
coning or spoofing attacks [4]. In fact, satellite information is neither encrypted
nor authenticated, thus an adversary can generate counterfeit satellite signals
and mislead the user’s device over its own location. A device can miscalculate
a location, e.g., because the device is compromised by a malware accidentally
downloaded while updating the device’s software or firmware from the Internet.
Finally, a user can intentionally manipulate the algorithm that generates the
device’s position to deceive the location-based service provider, for instance, to
avoid to be billed while driving on toll roads. The presence of a location verifier
prevents certain attacks against the integrity of locations that originate from the
user device. For example, the location verifier can apply state of the art navi-
gation message assurance mechanisms, or it can assign and revoke localization
assurance certificates [3].
Admittedly, the availability of a location verifier is a rather strong assump-
tion. Clearly, the system does not provide the user’s location, but the location of
his device. A relay attack, in which the user provides location data of a remote
device, will indeed be hard to counter and distance bounding techniques will
only partially be able to mitigate this type of attacks. Manipulation of the user
device can be prevented by assuming that the device is tamper resistant. If we
even assume that the antenna and its connection to the device are tamper resis-
tant, direct manipulation of the incoming raw data will even be ruled out. This
will require that the attacker has to resort to more complicated and expensive
means of attacking the system. A further observation is that location assurance
is not a yes-no question. Based on the raw data provided, the location verifier
will only be able to assign a trust or assurance level to the location. Despite
these possible concerns on how to realize a proper location verification service,
we will simply assume the availability of such an entity.
In the following we will further assume that the communication channels
between the User Device and the Location Verifier and between the User Device
and the Service Provider ensure an authenticated and confidential exchange of
messages. This assumption will allow us to concentrate on the information to
be exchanged between the parties, without having to give a precise protocol for
securing this communication. We consider authentication and confidentiality as
services that are provided at another layer in the communication stack.
3 Selective Location Blinding
In this section we explore a solution that helps users to have control on the
precision of disclosed location information while still allowing certified location
assurance.
3.1 Locations and hash chains
The central concept of our study is the notion of a location. We use the word
location as a generic term for describing a user’s position-related parameters,
such as latitude, longitude, elevation, velocity, acceleration, orientation, temporal
information, etc. An example of a location is x = (lat, long, t), where parameter
lat is the (normalized) latitude, long is the longitude and t is the time.
Without loss of generality, we assume that a location is represented by n
location parameters and that each parameter is a natural number. Location x is
therefore defined as a list of natural numbers,
x = (x1, . . . , xn) ∈ Nn.
We assume that each xi is denoted in base B > 1 and that, possibly after
padding with zeroes, it consists of d digits. For 1 ≤ i ≤ n, we have
xi = x
d−1
i x
d−2
i . . . x
0
i ,
where xd−1i is the most significant digit of xi and x
0
i is the least significant digit.
The accuracy of a parameter xi can be controlled by hiding its rightmost
digits. The granularity of this hiding is determined by the base B in which
the numbers are expressed. By x|p (for d − 1 ≤ p ≤ 0) we denote location x of
which the p least significant digits of each of the parameters are blinded. Phrased
differently, only the d− p most significant digits are exposed. Thus, x|d contains
no information on location x, x|d−1 exposes one digit, and x |0 equals x.
We will use a hash chain to selectively hide the least significant bits of a lo-
cation parameter. Let h be a cryptographic hash function that satisfies preimage
resistance, second preimage resistance and collision resistance. We assume that
h is publicly known.
For every location parameter xi (1 ≤ i ≤ n), we construct a hash chain Kxi =
Kdxi ,K
d−1
xi ,K
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xi ,. . . ,K
0
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0
xi is a randomly chosen seed and K
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h(xji ,K
j
xi) (for d− 1 ≥ j ≥ 0). Thus, the next hash in a chain contains the next
more significant digit of the location parameter. Creating the hash chain requires
the following calculations: K0xi , K
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xi)), etc.
We combine the hash chains for the different location parameters (x1, . . . , xn)
by defining Kjx = (K
j
x1 , . . . ,K
j
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d
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3.2 A selective location blinding protocol
Next, we show how to use these hash chains to selectively blind certified location
data. In our protocol, we will only focus on which information is exchanged and
we assume that authentication and confidentiality of the information exchange
is dealt with at other levels of the communication stack. Figure 2 shows the
entities involved and their interaction.
In our protocol, a User Device (e.g., a GPS-enabled phone) processes the
signals coming from the GPS satellites to calculate its own geographical position.
The calculated position will be verified and certified by the Location Verifier and
communicated to the Service Provider, who offers the service, adapted to the
User Device’s location.
In full detail, our protocol consists of the following steps. First, based on raw
data R (e.g., satellite signals), the User Device u calculates its location x and
generates the list of random seeds K0x for the hash chain. This information is
sent by u to the Location Verifier v. Based on its own context and observations
v verifies whether location x corresponds to raw data R. We will not specify
this context and observations because they are specific to the positioning system
used. We simply assume that v has sufficient information to assess u’s calculated
location. If the location is correct, v calculates the key chain and offers u a signed
certificate Certx = signv(u, v, T,Kx), where T is a time stamp. Such a certificate
is also called a location proof [5]. At this point, u can use this certificate in
subsequent communications to Service Providers. For each such communication,
u determines a precision p (for d− 1 ≤ p ≤ 0) and sends the hash corresponding
to this precision, Kpx, together with the partially blinded location x|p and the
location certificate Certx.
Using this information, the Service Provider reconstructs that part of the
hash chain that follows after Kpx and compares the final hash value, say K
′
x, with
the one from the certificate, Kx. In this way the Service Provider receives and
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Fig. 2. The location blinding protocol.
verifies the d− p most significant bits of the User Device’s location parameters,
while the least significant bits remain unknown to him.
An important feature of this protocol is that the User Device (i.e., the user
who owns the device) can decide upon the precision p after the certification of his
location. This will prevent the Location Verifier from having to certify the User
Device’s location for every possible precision p in advance. The same certificate
can be used for different service providers, while adapting the precision to the
needs of each of the particular services.
In the above protocol all location parameters are blinded with the same
precision. The protocol can be easily adapted to provide a different precision
for each location parameter. The only difference is that in the message from the
User Device to the Service Provider all location parameters have to be treated
separately.
The user device and the service provider should be able to agree upon how
much privacy will be disclosed according to the need-to-know principle. Here,
the user device and the service provider can run a service level agreement (SLA)
protocol which supports the two parties in determining the level of privacy sat-
isfying both the user’s privacy policy and the service’s requirement on location
details. In certain cases, the level of privacy can be decided by bilateral agree-
ment between a client and a server at the time of the client’s enrollment to the
service.
3.3 Validation
In this section, we give a basic reasoning why our protocol can guarantee the
secrecy of the least significant p bits of the location parameters and the authen-
ticity of the claimed location. In the previous section we made the assumption
that the communication channels between the user device and the location ver-
ifier (link (1) in Figure 1) and between the user device and the service provider
(link (2) in Figure 1) ensure the authenticated and private exchange of messages.
This makes sure that any outside attacker cannot learn any information about,
or modify the raw data R, the location x, the randomly generated seeds K0x,
the hashes Kx and the certificate Certx, as exchanged between these protocol
entities.
From the perspective of an insider, under the assumption that the location
verifier is fully trusted, we see two threats: (i) a user spoofing his location and
(ii) a compromised (or malicious) service provider learning more about the user’s
location than he is allowed to. The first threat is prevented by the certificate.
Because the location verifier verified the user’s location and because the hash
function is second preimage resistant and collision resistant, the service provider
can detect a location spoofing attack by checking the hash chain with the pro-
vided input. The second threat is prevented because the user only sends the
most significant digits of his location to the service provider. Further, because
the hash function is preimage resistant, the service provider cannot derive addi-
tional location information from the hashed values.
It is possible that from a series of observations a service provider (by conspir-
ing with other service providers) can derive more accurate data on the where-
abouts of a user than strictly allowed by the set precision, for example, using
a Kalman filter [6]. Another possibility is that conspiring service providers can
collaboratively calculate a precision which is better than the best precision for
each of them as they can calculate the intersection of the location data that each
of them received. To mitigate this type of attacks, we can combine our proto-
col with techniques providing anonymous usage of services (see Section 4). Since
users cannot be identified, the conspiring service providers have no means to link
location certificates to a particular user. There is one exception when a service
requires a sequence of location data from the same user. In this particular case,
anonymization cannot help as the service needs to ensure that several location
certificates come from the same user.
4 Related Work
A major concern for large-scale deployment of location-based services is the
potential abuse of users’ locations, a recognized sensitive information. Papers on
achieving location privacy can be classified into two classes: one uses location
cloaking and the other studies user anonymity.
Location cloaking [7,8,9] is a popular approach for providing location privacy
– a user’s location is cloaked (by a third party or the user’s device) before it is
given to a service provider. For instance, Gruteser and Grunwald [7] develop an
algorithm to adjust the resolution of location information based on the entities
who may be using services in a given area. Cheng et al. [8] study a system
model, which can be used to find the balance between privacy and the quality of
location-based services. In their model, users can specify their location, service
request and privacy requirements to the cloaking agent, which in turn produces
the cloaked location and an “imprecise” service request. In this way, the service
provider only knows the region where the user is, but does not know where
exactly. In order to achieve location privacy based on the notion of k-anonymity,
Zhong and Hengartner [10] develop a protocol based on homomorphic encryption
which can cloak a user’s location in a way that there are at least k−1 other people
within the cloaked area. The system Casper? [9] uses a location anonymizer
to blur a user’s exact location information into a cloaked area to satisfy user
specified privacy requirements. Our solution differs from these papers in several
aspects. First, we allow the users to have control on their location privacy using
hash chains – the user can provide an appropriate decryption key depending
on which level location information is required by the service provider. Second,
the above solutions require a trusted third party (cloaking agents or location-
anonymizers) to protect the user’s location privacy. Instead, we use a trusted
third party, a location verifier, only to certify a user’s location. Location cloaking
is performed and controlled by the users.
Anonymous usage (of a service) is another important feature in LBSs. It is
closely related to location privacy, in the sense that in LBSs it is desirable to
make sure that the precision of location information cannot be used to identify
a user. For this purpose, the algorithm developed by Gruteser and Grunwald [7]
can be used to achieve a certain degree of anonymity for users by decreasing the
accuracy of the revealed location information. Li et al. [11] propose a method to
prevent an adversary to track the location of users, by allowing users to change
their pseudonyms. Through a game theoretical analysis, Freudiger et al. [12]
suggest some improvements on this protocol by Li et al. [11]. Our proposed
solution has its focus on location privacy, it can be extended to satisfy more
properties like user anonymity.
Papers on verifying the correctness of location proofs provided by a user
are also related. Sastry et al. [13] present a simple protocol to securely check a
user’s location to be at some location within a region. By increasing the number
of verifiers in the protocol, it can verify the user’s location more precisely. Køien
and Oleshchuk [14] develop a protocol which can be used to check whether the
location reported by a user is inside of a polygon. Graham and Gray [15] propose
a protocol for verifying location claims using proofs gathered from the neighbor-
ing devices/users. In our solution, we assume the existence of a location verifier,
which is in charge of certifying location information. This can be achieved, for
example, using techniques proposed in [3].
5 Conclusion
We proposed a procedure for the selective blinding of location information. The
underlying idea is to hide the least significant digits of location data. This is a
rather simple idea, but the problem becomes more complex in the context of a
location verifier, when we require that the certificate does not depend on the
precision which will be set later by the user. Our solution based on hash chains
neatly enables the independence of a certificate from the required precision.
Because the procedure is based on hiding digits, the granularity of precision
is determined by the number base used to represent the location data. In our
current solution, the location verifier’s certificate depends on this base, which
implies that the granularity has to be decided upon before verification. An inter-
esting question is whether we can use homomorphic encryption to allow the user
to change the base of his certified location without requesting a new certificate.
In this paper we mainly focused on location data represented by natural
numbers. Other flexible and versatile means to represent location information
can also be supported. A wide range of solutions for representing location in
Internet protocols are proposed in RFC 5491 [16]. Furthermore, our results can
be extended to other types of contextual data that support a notion of precision,
such as a person’s age.
In our procedure, security properties of location certificates, such as secrecy
and integrity, are easily achieved as we employ a trusted location verifier. Com-
bining our protocol with other techniques (e.g., see Section 4) to provide users
with properties like anonymity and untraceability is part of our future work.
As part of a project with industry, we plan to experimentally implement
the architecture from Section 2. Our procedure will be validated by a prototype
application using a mobile network with existing GPS or the upcoming Galileo
receiver. The main challenge will be how to combine the different techniques
concerning location verification, location privacy and user anonymity.
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